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Taylor Law, the public-private dichotomy, and the legislative need
to weigh various policy considerations before deciding whether or
not a six-month period is appropriate.
Russell G. Wohl

ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW

EPTL § 13-3.3. Trustee as beneficiary denied right to receive proceeds of insurance policy due to decedent's failure to execute
trust agreement prior to designation of beneficiary
Fundamental to the law of trusts and estates is the canon that
the subject matter of a trust, or trust res, be an existent interest
recognized by law." An exception has been carved out of the genI See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 75 (1959) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. In a
similar vein, the RESTATEMENT provides that the subject matter of a trust can be neither
indefinite, id. § 76, nor a mere expectancy interest, id. § 86. Contingent interests, however,
have long been recognized as interests suitable for assignment to trusts provided they are
transferable to begin with. Id. § 85; cf. Jones v. Mayor of New York, 90 N.Y. 387, 390 (1882)
(non-existence of fund not fatal to validity of equitable assignment).
In addition to a sufficient trust res, the validity of any trust is further conditioned upon
successful planning and drafting in regard to the rule against perpetuities and the doctrine
of merger. See Lundgren, Estate Planning With Life Insurance and Trusts, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J.
132 (1982). Generally, problems with the rule against perpetuities arise in irrevocable trusts
concerning class gifts and "unborn widows." See id. at 133-34; see also EPTL § 9-1.3(c),
commentary at 239-40 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1988) ("unborn widow" problem remedied
by presumption that instrument refers to life in being at its effective date). Under the doctrine of merger, the ritual of appointing a trustee becomes meaningless when the legal rights
of the trustee and the receiving rights of the beneficiary merge in a single person creating a
legal life estate. See Greene v. Greene, 125 N.Y. 506, 510, 26 N.E. 739, 740 (1891). However,
the merging must be almost complete for such life estate to be created. Compare In re
Estate of Duskis, 76 Misc. 2d 411, 351 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sur. Ct. New York County 1973) (legal
life estate created where trustee-beneficiary had sole right to trust income and unfettered
power to raid income producing assets) with In re Will of Seidman, 88 Misc. 2d 462, 389
N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1976) (legal life estate not created where trustee-beneficiary had right to raid income-producing assets only if income itself was insufficient for
support and maintenance), modified, 58 App. Div. 2d 72, 395 N.Y.S.2d 674 (2d Dep't 1977).
As a prefatory matter, trusts and their concomitant requisites of formation are categorized by the time in which the trust comes into existence. See G. TuRN__, IRREVOCABLE
TRUSTS § 8.02 (1985). A transfer inter vivos is brought into being on the day of execution,,
see id., whereas a testamentary transfer is an ambulatory disposition, i.e., one which is to
take effect on the death of its creator. See 1 A. ScoTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 53 (3d ed. 1967). As
a general matter, a trust may be revoked by its creator provided he obtains written and
acknowledged consent from the beneficiaries. EPTL § 7-1.9 (McKinney Supp. 1988); see
Warren v. Cropsey, 29 App. Div. 2d 290, 296, 287 N.Y.S.2d 944, 950 (3d Dep't 1968) (not-
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eral rule in situations where the trust res is the expectant interest
of a trustee to receive the proceeds of an insurance policy 2 New
withstanding statement of irrevocability, trust subject to revocation with consent of parties
having beneficial interest).
Once all the requisites of the inter vivos trust have been gathered, there remains the
choice of the method of creation. See E. CLARK, L. LUSKY & A. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: WILLS, INTESTATE SUCCESSION, TRUSTS,

GIFTS, FUTURE

INTER-

430 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS].
The first method, transfer in trust, occurs when the settlor transfers the legal title of the res
to the trustee for the benefit of the third party beneficiary, the cestui, who retains equitable
title. See id. The second situation, the declaration of trust, concerns the situation in which
the owner of the subject property declares himself trustee for the benefit of the cestui. See
id.
2 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 82 comment b (exception for life insurance). Historically, the interest of the beneficiary under a life insurance trust was deemed a vested
one, i.e., the beneficiary-trustee was held to be the owner-recipient of the benefits provided
that the trust was irrevocable. See Central Bank v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195, 206 (1888)("[i]t is
indeed the general rule that a policy, and the money to become due under it, belong, the
moment it is issued, to the person or persons named in it as the beneficiary or beneficiaries"). This result may be attributed to the fact that the doctrine of third-party beneficiaries had not yet been fully developed. See Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest in a Life
InsurancePolicy, 31 YALE L.J. 343, 343 (1922). Gradually, courts began to develop divergent
positions. Some reasoned that the contingent interest or expectancy of the beneficiary vests
upon the death of the insured. See, e.g., Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 175-76, 157 P.2d
841, 842 (1945) (interest in revocable trust characterized as expectancy of gift at insured's
death); Cook v. Cook, 17 Cal. 2d 639, 646, 111 P.2d 322, 327 (1941) (beneficiary's rights vest
upon death of insured). Other courts have held that the interest of the beneficiary is vested
subject to divestment upon change of beneficiary. See, e.g., Wodell v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 320 Mass. 1, 2, 67 N.E.2d 469, 470 (1946) (recognition of qualified property
interest); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 454, 47 A.2d 340, 343 (1946)
(interest of beneficiary is vested property right); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 84
comment b (discussing vesting of rights).
In addition to being characterized as inter vivos or testamentary, insurance trusts may
be classified as funded or unfunded. See Adams & Bieber, Irrevocable Life Insurance
Trusts, 12 CUMB. L. REv. 283, 283 nn.2-3 (1982). In the funded insurance trust, the insured
settlor transfers the policy to the trustee as well as income producing property to be used to
pay the premiums. Id. at n.3. In the unfunded trust situation, the more common of the two,
the insured-settlor pays the premiums. Id. at n.2. One disadvantage of the funded trust,
which may explain its relative disfavor, is that the generation of income by the trust may be
treated as income to the insured. 26 U.S.CA § 677 (a)(3) (West Supp. 1988); see Friedman
& Wheeler, New Look at Insurance Trusts, 100 Tn. & EST. 396, 396 & n.8 (1961).
A particularly attractive feature of insurance trusts lies in the fact that they furnish a
considerable source of liquid assets available for use upon the insured's death, possibly
preventing the forced liquidation of other assets at terms unfavorable to the estate. See
Hershman, Life InsuranceFor Instant Creation and Subsequent Conservation of Estates,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 25, 1986, at 6, col. 1 (quoting 81-6 N.w YORK LIFE, ADVANCED UNDERWRITING
BULLETIN). However, proceeds of an insurance policy will be subject to an estate tax, as are
other assets of the insured, if the insured retains any "incidents of ownership" over the
policy. 26 U.S.C. § 2042 (2) (1982); see Friedman & Wheeler, supra, at 396. In effect, when
this situation arises, a portion of the proceeds normally available for use by the estate for
administrative expenses and executor/trustee compensation go to "provide death benefits
ESTS AND ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
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York has recognized the right to receive insurance proceeds as a
sufficient res statutorily, in section 13-3.3 of the Estates, Powers
and Trusts Law. S Generally, the provisions set forth in section 133.3 espouse preferential treatment of the proceeds of insurance
policies,4 in regard to estate taxation5 and the rights of third party
creditors.' Recently, in In re Stein,' the Appellate Division, Secfor the government, through the operation of the estate tax." Huff, Uniting Life Insurance
With Trusts, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 16, 1987, at 15, col. 1; see 26 U.S.C. § 2042 (1) (1982). The
surest way to remove the proceeds from the estate of the insured is to place the policy in an
irrevocable trust and concomitantly remove all incidents of ownership from the insured. See
Saks, Insurance Trends and Topics, 7 EST. PLAN. 246, 246 (1980); see also Friedman &
Wheeler, supra, at 397 n.14 (power to appoint trust principal may be deemed incident of
ownership).
Generally, much of the discussion surrounding incidents of ownership and degrees of
control focuses on the issue of whether the trust in question was testamentary, i.e., a will
substitution. Such "trusts" are invalid if executed without the formalities attendant to the
creation of a proper will. See Annotation, Testamentary Nature of Life Insurance Trust, 53
A.L.R.2d 1112, 1114 n.7 (1957). As a matter of course, life insurance trusts have been held
non-testamentary, notwithstanding the reservation of substantial powers of control in the
insured. Id. at 1118; see RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 57 comment f; see also Gordon v.
Portland Trust Bank, 201 Or. 648, 655-57, 271 P.2d 653, 653-56 (1954) (trust held valid
notwithstanding reservation of cash surrender, loan rights, and right to change beneficiary).
Finally, the proceeds of insurance trusts are a significant factor to be considered in
post-mortem planning of the surviving spouse, payment of tax on estate assets, and income
replacement if the insured was the principal wage earner. Swirnoff, Life Insurance: Filling
the Need for Estate Liquidity, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1982, at 15, col. 3; see Petrie, Increasing
the Liquidity of an Estate Involves Combination of Pre- and Post-DeathPlanning,11 EST.
PLAN. 98, 99-100 (1984).

3 EPTL § 13-3.3(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1988). Section 13-3.3(a)(1) provides in part
that "[iut shall not be necessary to the validity of any such trust agreement or declaration of
trust that it have a trust corpus other than the right of the trustee as beneficiary to receive
such proceeds." Id. This provision was patterned on a similar Wisconsin statute. See Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 206.52 (West 1957).
See EPTL § 13-3.3(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988). In 1976, this section was repealed by
ch. 626, § 1, [1976] N.Y. LAws 1340 (McKinney) which, inter alia, broadened the scope of
the section to include proceeds other than those derived from insurance policies. See EPTL
§ 13-3.3(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988). The statute provides in part:
The proceeds of thrift, savings, pension, retirement, death benefit, stock bonus
and profit-sharing plans, systems or trusts, of life, group life, industrial life or
accident and health insurance policies and of annuity, endowment and supplemental insurance contracts (hereinafter referred to as "proceeds") may be made
payable to a trustee designated as beneficiary ....
Id.
, See EPTL § 13-3.3(c) (McKinney Supp. 1988). The section provides that "for...
estate tax purposes [the proceeds] shall not be deemed payable to... the estate." Id.
0 See id. The section provides further that the "proceeds received by the trustee shall
not be subject to the debts of the insured." Id. Regarding policy considerations underlying
the rule, one author has noted that "[b]ecause family preservation has been and still is
considered the firm foundation of our society's health and well being, creditor laws prefer
insurance beneficiaries over creditors with respect to life insurance proceeds." Hershman,
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ond Department, set forth the conditions under which a trusteebeneficiary may receive the proceeds of an insurance policy, holding that payment is proper only if the trust agreement predates the
designation of the beneficiary under the insurance policy and if
that trust agreement is identified in the beneficiary designation."
In Stein, the decedent designated a trustee as beneficiary of
his life insurance policy," and thereafter notified the insurance carrier of the designation.10 Subsequently, the decedent executed a
trust agreement in which he appointed that same beneficiary of the
policy as trustee of the proceeds flowing therefrom. 1 Some time
later, the decedent died intestate."2 Relying on the designation of
the trustee as beneficiary, the insurance company paid to the beneficiary the face amount of the policy, less outstanding loans.' 3 The
administrator of the estate instituted a discovery proceeding to
recoup the proceeds of the policy, 14 prompting the trustee to com-

mence a formal accounting procedure joining as parties the administrator of the estate, the insurance carrier, the decedent's creditors, and the beneficiaries of the estate. 5 The Surrogate's Court,
Suffolk County, awarded summary judgment to the insurance carrier, dismissing the proceedings on the premise that payment of
supra note 2, at 6, col. 1.
7 131 App. Div. 2d 68, 520 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dep't 1987).
' Id. at 72, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
Id. at 69, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 157. The decedent, Jules Stein, purchased a $550,000 insurance policy from Greater Beneficial Union of Pittsburgh. Id. Thereafter, Stein designated
"James Hume as Trustee" as the beneficiary of the policy. Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. The instrument directed Hume, upon Stein's death, "to collect the proceeds of
[the] policy and satisfy all valid claims... for unpaid debts.... After all claims have been
satisfied, he is directed to pay any remaining proceeds, less expenses, to my estate." Id. at
69-70, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
1 Id.
at 70, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 158. Without having left a will, Stein died on Sept. 19,
1981. Id. Greater Beneficial Union of Pittsburgh was notified of the death in writing on
Sept. 30, 1981. Id.
13 Id. The amount paid under the policy was $516,718.58. Id.
1" Id. at 70, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 158. The discovery proceeding was instituted upon application of the decedent's creditors. Id. Later, the parties stipulated that the discovery proceeding would be held in abeyance pending initiation of formal accounting procedures by Hume.
Id.
15 Id. The fifty-four creditors joined as parties were seeking in excess of one million
dollars. See Insurance Proceeds Barred To Trustee As Beneficiary, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 23, 1987,
at 1, col. 3. The accounting showed that the trustee paid $464,969.36 on claims he deemed
valid. See id. The remainder of the proceeds were distributed as trustee commissions and
legal fees. Id.

1988]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

the proceeds to the trustee relieved it of further liability. 18
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment and held that the
insurance proceeds were improperly distributed to the trustee-beneficiary,' 7 within the meaning of the 1976 amendment to section
13-3.3 of the EPTL.'a Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Spatt
took issue with the surrogate's interpretation of section 13-3.3,
which declared that the legislature did not require that the trust
agreement predate the designation of the trustee as beneficiary.1 9
Adhering to general principles of statutory construction,20 the
court reasoned that the surrogate placed undue reliance on section

16Stein, 131 App. Div. 2d at 70, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 158. The insurance company's intial
motion for summary judgment was denied due to opposition by the administrator and two
claimants. Id. Upon renewal of the motion, summary judgment was granted to the insurer.
Id.
1I See Stein, 131 App. Div. 2d at 72, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 159. Accordingly, the court entered summary judgment against the insurer on the issue of liability and remitted the action
for a determination of damages. Id.
1" See id. at 69, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 157. Prior to 1976, section 13-3.3(a) outlined the
method of payment of insurance proceeds as follows:
(a) Life insurance may be made payable to a trustee to be named as beneficiary in
the policy and the proceeds of such insurance shall be paid to such trustee and be
held and disposed of by him as provided in a trust agreement made by the insured during his lifetime.
EPTL § 13-3.3(a) (McKinney 1967)(emphasis added). Pursuant to ch. 626, § 1, [1976] N.Y.
Laws 1340 (McKinney), the section was repealed and a new section 13-3.3 was added to
provide in part:
(a) The proceeds [of benefit plans and insurance policies] may be made payable to
a trustee designated as beneficiary in the manner prescribed by this section and
named as:
(1) Trustee under a trust agreement or declaration of trust in existence at the
date of such designation, and identified in such designation....
EPTL § 13-3.3(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1988)(emphasis added).
1" See Stein, 131 App. Div. 2d at 71, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 159. Specifically, the court's interpretation differed sharply from that of the surrogate as to the impact of section 13-3.3(f) on
the statute as a whole. Id. Section 13-3.3(f), added in 1976, provides: "This section shall be
construed as declaring the law as it existed prior to its enactment and not as modifying it."
EPTL § 13-3.3(f) (McKinney Supp. 1988). The surrogate reasoned that section 13-3.3(f)
required the court to look back to the law as it existed prior to 1976. Under such an interpretation, the designation in issue would be upheld, since the insured executed the trust
agreement within his lifetime. See Stein, 131 App. Div. 2d at 71, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 159. The
Appellate Division, Second Department, summarily dismissed this analysis as unsound, concluding that "subdivision (f) cannot mean that the prior law supersedes the present
amended statute." Id. at 72, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
'0 Stein, 131 App. Div. 2d at 71-72, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 159. The court reasoned that
"[w]hen the Legislature amends a statute, it is presumed that the amendment was made to
effect some purpose and make some change in the existing law." Id. at 72, 520 N.Y.S.2d at
159.
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13-3.3(f),2 1 resulting in an interpretation that ran afoul of the intent of the legislature as evidenced by the plain meaning of the
language employed.2 2 The scope of section 13-3.3(f), the court held,
is limited by the language of section 13-3.3(a), which clearly mandates that the validity of the designation of a trustee as beneficiary
is contingent upon the execution of a trust agreement prior to designation of the beneficiary and identification of the trust agree23
ment therein.
Notwithstanding the argument that the sole impact of the
1976 amendment to section 13-3.3 was to extend the contractual
bases from which proceeds may be derived,2 4 it is suggested that
the court was correct in its conclusion that the plain meaning of
the present version of section 13-3.3(a)(1) requires the execution of
a trust agreement before the designation of a trustee as beneficiary
and the identification of that agreement within the designation.2 5
In addition, the court's determination that the trust agreement
21 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
22 See Stein, 131 App. Div. 2d at 72, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 159. The Second Department

argued that the analysis of the surrogate's court, "if carried to its logical extreme, could
render the 1976 amendment of the EPTL § 13-3.3(a)(1) a nullity." Id. at 71-72, 520
N.Y.S.2d at 159.
"' See id. at 72, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
2 See EPTL § 13-3.3, commentary at 105 (McKinney Supp. 1988). A meritorious argument can be made that section 13-3.3(f) mandates that the present version of the statute
was not intended to abrogate prior law, and hence the sole effect of the 1976 amendment
was the expansion of the term "proceeds" to include payments made other than through life
insurance policies. See id. Indeed, this analysis is given further credence by the seemingly
contradictory nature of the section 13-3.3(a) expansion of "proceeds" and the section 133.3(a)(1) restriction requiring that the trust instrument predate the designation of the beneficiary. See EPTL § 13-3.3(a)-(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1988). It is submitted, however, that
the restriction relating to designation may be the legislature's exaction of a quid pro quo for
the concomitant expansion of the includable proceeds.
The court's summary treatment of section 13-3.3(f) of the EPTL, without discussing
section 13-3.3(e), creates an area of opacity. See Stein, 131 App. Div. 2d at 72, 520 N.Y.S.2d
at 159; supra note 19. Section 13-3.3(e) provides that "[niothing in this section shall effect
the validity of any designation heretofore made," EPTL § 13 - 3 .3(e) (McKinney Supp. 1988),
while section 13-3.3(f) purports to declare the law as it existed prior to the amendment. See
EPTL § 13-3.3(f) (McKinney Supp. 1988); supra note 19. The court offered no opinion as to
whether section 13-3.3(f) was intended to have a retroactive or prospective effect, but
merely stated that the section "does not require a contrary result" to the one reached by the
court. See Stein, 131 App. Div. 2d at 72, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 159. It is suggested that section 133.3(f) be viewed as declaratory of prior statutory law. In this way, the apparently conflicting
provisions may, to some extent, be reconciled. See Eastern Milk Producers Coop. Ass'n v.
N.Y. Dep't of Agric. & Mkts., 58 N.Y.2d 1097, 1101, 449 N.E.2d 708, 711, 462 N.Y.S.2d 814,
817 (1983)("amendment must be regarded as but a legislative amplification of its previous
intent").
25 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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must predate the designation of a beneficiary is consistent with
section 3-3.7 of the EPTL, a related provision, which sets forth the
formalities governing "pour over" trusts.2" Finally, the practical effect of the Stein decision is that the insurer would be given notice
of the identity of the trustee-beneficiary, a posture which is consis27
tent with the principles of section 13-3.2(d)(2) of the EPTL.
Whatever the merits of the court's analysis, however, the decision is troublesome for a number of reasons. First, the Stein decision violates a basic precept of trust law, namely, that the courts
ought to give effect to, and, where necessary, divine the intent of
the parties creating the agreement.2 Furthermore, although the
26 See EPTL § 13-3.3, commentary at 415 (McKinney 1967). Section 3-3.7 furthered
the design of section 13-3.3 in providing a statutory base for "pour over" trusts, i.e., trusts
to which the residuary estate of a decedent may pass, thereby defeating distribution by the
laws of intestacy. See id.; see also EPTL § 3-3.7, commentary at 500-01 (McKinney 1967).
Section 3-3.7 provides that the testamentary disposition to a trustee under an existing intervivos trust agreement is valid as long as "such trust instrument is executed and acknowledged . . . prior to or contemporaneously with the execution of the will, and such trust
instrument is identified in such will." EPTL § 3-3.7 (McKinney 1967)(emphasis added).
The 1976 amendment to section 13-3.3, see supra note 4, closely resembles section 3-3.7,
and interpreting the sections as contemplating similar requirements furthers the design of
the legislature to effect a harmonization of the laws regarding the designation of beneficiaries. See, e.g., Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature Relating to Designation of Beneficiaries to Receive Payment of Certain Funds on Death of the
Person Entitled, [1952] N.Y. LAw. RIv. COMM'N REP. 163, note at 171 (articulated purpose of
consolidation and harmonization); Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission Relating to Unification of the Rules Governing Payment of Funds Payable by Banks, Insurance
Companies, Government Agencies and Other Institutional Debtors on the Death of the Person Entitled, [1951] N.Y. LAw REv. COMM'N REP. 587, note at 592 (purpose is "to unify rules
governing designation of beneficiaries").
27 See EPTL § 13-3.2(d)(2) (McKinney 1967). Section 13-3.2(d)(2) requires the designation to be "[a]greed to by the insurance company." Id. It appears, however, that notice of
the designation of the trustee as beneficiary was not dispositive of the issue in Stein since
the designation of the beneficiary "as Trustee," see supra note 9, effectively identified the
beneficiary of the policy. See Stein, 131 App. Div. 2d at 69, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
It should be noted that the formalistic view of section 13-3.3 advanced by the court
requires careful consideration by estate planners in order to preserve the significant liquidity and tax benefits enjoyed by insurance trusts, as such benefits may be lost if the requisite
formalities of proper designation are not adhered to. See Huff, supra note 2, at 15, col. 1.
The ability to shield the face amount of the life insurance proceeds from the decedent's
gross estate remains an investment tax advantage under the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Id. at
17, col. 1, Swirnoff, supra note 2, at 15, col. 6.
2 See Stratford Fin. Corp. v. Finex Corp., 367 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1966). In Stratford, the
Second Circuit held that "[t]he formation of a trust relationship is dependent upon the
intention of the parties, which, if not clearly indicated by the language of the parties, is to
be inferred from all the circumstances." Id. at 571 (citing 1 A. Scorr, TRUSTS § 12.2 (2d ed.
1956)). See also Glidden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 41 App. Div. 2d 621, 622, 340
N.Y.S.2d 718, 719 (1st Dep't 1973) (decedent's intent controls designation notwithstanding
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court's insistent adherence to the plain meaning of the statutory
language of section 13-3.3 is consistent with principles of statutory
interpretation, 9 it is suggested that the better solution would have
been to vitiate the trust in question, notwithstanding the intent of
the parties involved, by concluding that the trust was an invalid
attempt to give preference to some creditors over others upon the
decedent's death.3 0 It is suggested that in so doing, the court would
have advanced a decision consistent with both principles of statutory interpretation and the law of trusts and estates.
The Appellate Division, Second Department's decision in In re
Stein sets forth an analysis of section 13-3.3 of the EPTL that adheres to the language of the statute as amended. However, it is
submitted that the court failed to consider Article 13 of the EPTL
as a fully integrated provision and consequently left certain issues
unresolved as to the proper implementation of the section. Regardless of the wisdom of the rule, the decision in In re Stein merits
careful attention from the attorney-draftsman and insurer alike.
Andrew Bonzani

ambiguity in policy). It appears from the court's opinion in Stein that the intent of the
decedent to create a trust was undisputed. See Stein, 131 App. Div. 2d at 69-70, 520
N.Y.S.2d at 157-58. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 2 (trust definition
premissed on intention of the parties).
2 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
30 See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. AcT § 1811(3) (McKinney 1981). Section 1811(3) provides
that "[p]reference shall not be given in the payment of a debt over other debts of the same
class." Id. Generally, attempts to give preference to certain creditors of a decedent when the
estate is insolvent have been struck down. See, e.g., In re Plotkin, 56 Misc. 2d 754, 762, 290
N.Y.S.2d 46, 54 (Sur. Ct. New York County 1968)(attempt to prefer claimant creditor of
insolvent estate invalid).

